When Iraq entered Kuwait America was not able to stop the action by simply launching some missiles towards Baghdad. Kuwait was occupied for many months before the world took effective action. During that time, the women were raped and the men tortured - some were even killed. But no matter how bad the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was, it would look like a party in comparison to the holocaust which the Jewish people would endure while the Allies decided what to do.

If anything, the aftermath of the Gulf War serves to encourage such action in the future. The declared enemy of the world, Saddam Hussein, still sits in Baghdad. A few years after being "bombed back to the stone age" it was possible to completely rebuild the infrastructure despite a boycott. Many in the world press today to lift all sanctions even though Iraq has every intention to continue its programs to develop non-conventional weapons. All this has been duly noted by Assad and Israel's other neighbors.

It should also be noted that, in many respects, the Gulf War was a "last hurrah" for American power. A substantial part of the equipment expended in the war was not replaced. Force levels since that war have also not been maintained.

MYTH: THE GULF WAR PROVES THAT STRATEGIC DEPTH AND GROUND FORCES ARE IRRELEVANT

"There are those who say that the Gulf War proved that territory has no value, that the missiles reach everywhere. To all of those I say: ask the Kuwaitis if land has no value. Victory in war is achieved by conquering territory and ground fighting, and not in the launching of missiles. Therefore, anyone who wants to prevent losing in war, has to be able to win in the ground battle. Minister of Health Ephraim Sneh (Labor) "Haaretz" 4 August 1994

"The Golan Heights has a very important strategic value and no sophisticated weapon and no electronic system can replace it if we have to go to war." Chief of Staff Major General Amnon Lipkin Shahak - Kol Yisrael Radio 10 December, 1995

When asked by Ben Yishai what force will dominate the future battlefield, (then IDF Chief of Staff and now Foreign Minister) Ehud Barak did not even mention missiles but rather said "I am certain, that in the foreseeable future, the heavy armored units will stand in the center of our land battles with tanks playing the key role, this without denigrating of course the critical role of the air force and to a certain degree also the navy." ("Yediot Ahronot" 23 December, 1994)

Dore Gold (Jerusalem Post 27 May 1994) writes that "much of the new technology Israel would need after a Syrian accord might not be as effective as first thought." Gold cites, for example, a CIA finding that air attacks against several divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard succeeded in eliminating fewer than 20% of their tanks (166 out of 846).

Spy satellites are also limited as there is much evidence that periodic rather than continuous observation is problematic. Writing in the Jan/Feb 1994 issue of Foreign Affairs, Elliot A. Cohen ("The Mystique of U.S. Air Power") writes about "the sheer difficulty of knowing what damage had been done. From an overhead photograph, for example, it may prove difficult to figure out whether a small black hole on top of a hardened aircraft shelter indicates a hit by a dud bomb, an explosion in the thick, rubble filled space between the shelter's inner and outer walls, an explosion within the shelter or an artful paint job by camouflage experts."

In point of fact, as far as Israel is concerned, American technology was a dismal failure during the Gulf War: the Patriot missiles failed to intercept even one Iraqi Scud and American technology failed to destroy or even keep track of the Scud missile sites.

MYTH: AS LONG AS ISRAEL HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYRIAN ARMS AREN'T RELEVANT

While nuclear weapons certainly have a deterrent effect, they are of limited value in addressing a security challenge which erodes Israel's position on a piecemeal basis. Simply put: When can Israel justify a nuclear response? After the first Syrian soldier crosses the border?, Syria occupies the Galilee?, Haifa?

MYTH: AN AMERICAN-ISRAEL MUTUAL DEFENSE WOULD DETER ARAB ATTACKS

The Arab states would not be deterred by threats of American retaliation, knowing full well that if Israel falls, America's primary interest would not be to punish those who destroyed her but rather to insure the stability of the region and the uninterrupted supply of Middle Eastern oil. And nothing would contribute more to the destabilization of the Post Israel Middle East than to create a power vacuum by punishing the powers who destroyed the Jewish State.

MYTH: SINCE THE BREAK UP OF THE USSR THE ARABS HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE TO AMERICA

Russia continues to supply both new arms and spare parts to Syria. The Russians have already provided the Syrians with tens of millions of dollars of arms credit. ("Haaretz" March 8, 1995) Russia's role in the development of an Arab nuclear capability is even more ominous.

MYTH: A "FULL PEACE" AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA WILL BRING STABILITY.

"The elite which rules relies on a small minority in Syrian society, the Alawites (around 13% of the population), which derives its legitimacy , in part, from the ideology of the struggle with Zionism and defense of Pan-Arab interests. Regimes of this type generally find their ultimate legitimacy in struggle ... Peace with Israel, open borders, free tourism, embassies and flags, the end of the ideological tension with Zionism - has only one meaning: the beginning of the end of Bath rule in Syria. How does, if at all, an agreement with Israel jibe with the stability of the regime and its survival - this is the central dilemma of Assad." Shlomo Ben Ami ("Haaretz" April 28, 1995)

Paradoxically, withdrawal from the Golan, by slashing the time available to effectively respond to a Syrian threat, may ultimately leave the IDF with no choice but to carry out a preemptive strike against Syria even when the Syrian moves are subject to interpretation.

MYTH: THE SYRIAN ARMY IS WEAK

"Quantitatively, the Syrian army now matches the IDF; in certain areas, such as tanks and surface-to-surface missiles, the Syrians even have a slight advantage over the IDF. Qualitatively, the IDF still maintains a clear advantage in terms of equipment and personnel, but this advantage is reduced by the fact that the IDF is comprised mostly of reservists. On the other hand, the Syrian military is mostly comprised of a standing force -- able to move straight from its permanent bases, whether to halt or launch an attack."

"Syria's growing strength is a fact. Therefore, in any agreement with Syria, according to which Israel will withdraw from its current positions on the Golan Heights, Israel must ensure that Syria's growing power does not endanger it, even if extremist factors, that oppose the peace agreement, take power in Syria."

"Therefore, the security arrangement must include significant arms-and missile-control elements, the demilitarization of broad areas, and international supervision of the operation of weapons systems capable of threatening and surprising Israel."

"It would be desirable if the Prime Minister would change his declaration a little, and instead of determining that "the depth of the withdrawal be proportional to the depth of the normalization and peace," he should now say to the Syrians: "The depth of the withdrawal will be proportional to the depth of the security arrangements," Otherwise, any change in Syria and its regime would require Israel to move to alert status under conditions that are much more difficult than those which prevail today." Ron Ben-Yishai ("Yediot Ahronot" 16 September 1994)

"The Syrian army continues to seriously exercise as if there is no peace process. Syria has a difficult time buying military equipment from the CIS, because of the need to pay in cash, but she buys weapons in the East....If the president of Syria should decide to go to war, he will receive the recommendation to do so from his military commanders, as their training program continues and the Syrian Army is still considered strong and skilled." O.C. Northern Command Maj. Gen. Amiran Levin ("Haaretz" April 17, 1995)

"What concerns me no less than the Scud C's is that Syria is involved in - and this also is not new - the manufacture of chemical weapons. Weapons which, when tied to the Scud C, are, from the standpoint of the State of Israel, a matter which most certainly deserves attention." Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin Shahak ("Maariv" May 3, 1995)

According to a study of chemical weapons by Dr. Danny Shoham of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University, Syria today is the strongest military power in the Arab world in the area of chemical weapons. The Syrians have produced thousands of chemical bombs as well as a well developed delivery capability including both attack planes and Scud-B missiles (100 to 200). Recently the Syrians began producing the longer range Scud-C and possibly the M9 missiles in cooperation with Iran, North Korea and China. Using these longer range missiles, the Syrians will be able to strike literally every point in Israel from any location in Syria.

Critics of the current Israel-Syria negotiations point to the fact that Israel has apparently dropped its demands for any reduction in Syria's military strength as part of an overall peace agreement, thereby allowing the Syrians to not only maintain but actually enhance their chemical weapons threat on Israel in the future. They also note that while Prime Minister Peres frequently speaks of Syria joining in a coalition against the Islamic fundamentalists, that in practice the Syrians view Iran as a strategic ally and partner - as evidenced by their cooperation in missile production. ("Haaretz" May 26, 1995)

If anything, peace with Israel will enable Syria to tilt the balance of power in its favor. If Syrian-Israeli relations follow the pattern of the Egyptian-Israeli experience, Syria will enjoy open access to the most sophisticated of Western arms supplies after it signs an agreement with Israel.

MYTH: SYRIA'S GOAL IS PEACE

Speaking in Washington at a press conference on Friday October 7, 1994, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara explained that the decision to make peace with Israel is a "strategic choice". Minister Shara studied in America and has a good command of the English language. His choice, therefore, of the term "strategic" is not by chance.

"Strategy" is a means to achieve a given goal. Minister Shara is saying publicly that peace with Israel is not in and of itself a "goal" but rather a "means". What then is Syria's goal?

Prime Minister Shimon Peres provides the answer to this puzzle when he explains that the Arabs decided to negotiate with Israel when they realized that they could not destroy Israel on the battlefield. And so, there has been no change in the Syrian goal. The goal of erasing the Jewish State from the map. There is only a change in tactics.

Despite the pleasant cover of words of peace, in both the press conference and the interview later with Israel Television's Ehud Ya'ari, the Syrian Foreign Minister termed the very establishment of the State of Israel as an act of aggression against the Arab people. And, as he warned, as long as Israel sits on occupied lands the Syrian nation will say "this is surrender, this is not peace."

MYTH: THE PERES GOVERNMENT'S PEACE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA ADDRESSES THE SYRIAN MISSILE THREAT.

"Rabin has made clear in recent weekss that he will not insist on reduction in the Syrian army, since there is no precedent to it in the agreement with Egypt, and since it is impossible to differentiate between conventional and nuclear forces." "Haaretz" diplomatic correspondent Aluf Ben ("Haaretz" 1 May, 1995)

This is not a minor issue. "Former Mossad Chief Yitzhak Hoffi told a symposium on Israel-Syria Relations last night that demilitarization and foreign forces cannot be relied on as adequate security arrangements and that the only way that Israel could justify a withdrawal is if Syria makes a serious reduction in forces of as much as 80%."

"With that, Hoffi also pointed out that Iraq sits on Syria's border and has participated in every war against Israel. Hoffi maintained that Israel should be on the alert for an attack from Syria or Iraq in the future, taking into account the fact that Assad won't rule forever." ("Haaretz" & "The Jerusalem Post" 15 November 1994)

MYTH: ASSAD KEEPS HIS WORD

"Speaking to reporters on Tuesday, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres commented on Syrian denials of involvement in terror activities in Southern Lebanon by noting that "those who support terror don't necessarily support truth." (Globes [business paper] 14 December 1994)

"Assad's 20-year pattern of behavior establishes that he regularly breaks his promises. Typical of a despot, he keeps his word when it's convenient and breaks it when not." Daniel Pipes, ("The Jerusalem Post 19 August, 1994). Among the examples cited by Pipes are PKK anti-Turkish activities originating from Syria in violation of security protocols signed in 1987 and 1992 between Syria and Turkey and the illegal placement of 21 surface-to-air missiles and eight missile launchers in the "thin out" strip within 25 kilometers of the border with Israel.

MYTH: AMERICA CAN BE RELIED UPON TO SHARE COMMON INTEREST IN CASE OF SYRIAN VIOLATIONS

The principle goal of Israel is to survive. But the continued existence of the Jewish State is not the prime goal of America. The United State's principle interest is the maintenance of order in the region.

As Henry Kissinger told President Nixon during the Suez Canal Egyptian missile crisis (1970), "Israel, with her survival at stake, cannot afford to take chances...We, on the other hand, have an incentive to minimize such evidence (of violation of the cease fire agreement between Egypt and Israel [IMRA]), since the consequences of finding violations are so unpleasant. Violations force us to choose between doing something about them and thus risk the blowup of the initiative; or doing nothing and thus renege on our promises to Israel, posing the threat of her taking military action." (Henry Kissinger, White House Years, page 587).

MYTH: AMERICAN TROOPS CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE "TRIP-WIRE" FOR PEACE

The way that you "trip" the American "trip-wire" is by killing American soldiers. This was the entire principle of NATO. The Europeans feared that the U.S. would never unleash its nuclear arsenal just to defend them and hoped that a thousand dead American G.I.'s would get the U.S. angry enough to launch their missiles.

So that's the rule about trip-wire troops: You can drive by them, fly over them, do anything you want - just so long as you don't kill any of them.

The American trip wire does not work in Israel's favor:

• If Syria invades via Lebanon, it won't be "tripped".
• If Syria shoots missiles over the American's heads, it won't be "tripped".
• If Syrian bulldozers push American jeeps off the road - but don't kill any Americans -it still won't be "tripped".

The talk of the American trip-wire forces in the Golan reminds one of the most heroic episode in the ill fated American presence in Lebanon: the American officer who, standing alone with a simple handgun, was able to stop a column of Israeli tanks. He could do that because he knew that an Israeli would not dare run him over. The Syrians, no doubt, would play a much better game of "chicken".

MYTH: THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

"It is necessary to consider as uncertain all of the declarations of President [Clinton] regarding aid to Israel and his help to limit the risks of peace." Position paper presented to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres by the Planning Department of the Foreign Ministry on Thursday, 10 November, 1994 ("Haaretz" 11.11.94)

America's arms policy is based on circular reasoning: The U.S. will not hurt Israel's military superiority, therefore any sales which the U.S. makes to the Arabs cannot, by definition, hurt Israel's position, since otherwise the U.S. would not make the sale.

The U.S. continually demonstrates that it is not serious about this commitment. Last year the U.S. approved Saudi participation in the EYEGLASS satellite project - over the objection of their own security establishment. The opportunity to get Saudi money injected into the American project was simply more important than security concerns. Israeli officials were stunned by the American move and only after much effort was the plan halted.

Now the Clinton Administration plans to sell sophisticated air-to-air missiles to the UAE and anti-tank TOW 2B missiles to Kuwait. Israel opposes the sales, terming them a "technological jump" for the Arabs which could find its way into unfriendly hands in the future. Israeli opposition has been silenced by promises to offset the sale, further escalating the regional arms race.

The U.S. also is interested in limiting Israel's independent ability to produce weapons. The U.S. State Department objects to the participation of Israel Aircraft in a military tender to launch satellites on the grounds that it does not want to encourage the development of missiles in Israel ("Haaretz" 20 November 1995).

In the past the United States has threatened to withhold vital technology to Israel in order to force the Jewish State to change her policies. This activity runs completely counter to the American commitment to maintain Israel's edge.

[Deputy Defense Minister Motta] Gur implied that territorial concessions were unavoidable due to U.S. pressure and Israel's need for US military technology. The key to winning a war these days is technology, not territory, he said.

'We don't want to reach a situation [where we have to choose] between the U.S. and the Golan, between certain weapons systems and part of the Golan,' he said. 'We don't want to reach a state where we are facing an ultimatum.'" (The Jerusalem Post September 14, 1994)

The late Prime Minister Rabin is no stranger to this darker side of American diplomacy. He was Prime Minister in 1975 when President Ford decided to "reassess" U.S. policy in the Middle East, refusing to sign new arms deals with Israel. At the time, Rabin asked Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; "I must know where we stand in our relations. From now on, whenever there is any disagreement between us because we believe that your position endangers Israel's security, do you intend to 'reassess'?." (The Rabin Memoirs, page 262).