INTPARSHA -28: Parashat Emor

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Subject: INTPARSHA -28: Parashat Emor
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From: Yeshivat Har Etzion's Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash
To: heb_roots_chr@geocities.com
Subject: INTPARSHA -28: Parashat Emor

YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
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INTRODUCTION TO PARASHAT HASHAVUA

PARASHAT EMOR

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The Widow and the Divorcee
by Rabbi Jonathan Mishkin

Our parasha this week begins by listing instructions
intended to maintain a high level of holiness among the
kohanim, Israel's priestly class. Among the restrictions
placed on this chosen family are limitations on whom they
may wed. "They shall not marry a woman defiled by
harlotry, nor shall they marry one divorced from her
husband. For they are holy to their God" (Leviticus
21:7). This rule applies to all kohanim (a common priest
is called a Kohen Hedyot), whereas the High Priest's
(Kohen Gadol) marriage options are slightly more narrow:
"He (the High Priest) may marry only a woman who is a
virgin. A widow, a divorced woman, or one who is
degraded by harlotry - such he may not marry. Only a
virgin of his own kin may he take to wife - that he may
not profane his offspring among his kin, for I the Lord
have sanctified him" (verses 13-15).

The Torah has introduced four classes of women,
three of whom are generally forbidden and a fourth who is
off limits to the Kohen Gadol alone. Women who are
forbidden to all priests are: (1) a divorced woman, (2) a
ZONA and (3) a CHALALA. Several different types of women
are labeled ZONA in Jewish law: a woman who is not
Jewish; a woman who has slept with a man whom she is
forbidden to marry (her brother for example); a woman who
has slept with a CHALAL. If a kohen sleeps with a woman
whom he cannot marry, a divorcee for example, a son born
of that union is called a CHALAL and does not have the
legal status of a priest but of an Israelite. A daughter
born of that union is called a CHALALA and may in turn
not marry a kohen. In addition, as mentioned, a Kohen
Gadol may not marry (4) a widow. (For a thorough
discussion of these categories and their applications to
the kohen, see Rambam Hilkhot Issurei Bi'a chapters 17-
19.)

This essay will attempt to understand the bans on
widows and divorcees but I recognize that I am about to
raise ideas which some readers may find troubling or even
offensive. As such, I will try to deal with the issues
as sensitively as I can, with the recognition as well
that sometimes effort is required to reconcile the
Torah's absolute morality with our own sensitivities.

The widow and the divorcee are sometimes linked in
Jewish law. For instance, when a ketuba is drawn up for
either woman (for a second marriage), the amount to be
paid in case of divorce or widowhood is set at 100 dinar,
half the amount payable to a virgin. It seems that
because a virgin is more desirable to a man than a woman
who has been married before, she can demand a higher
ketuba. Yet, as we have seen, despite the fact that both
women have been married before, the Torah treats them
differently when it comes to kohanim. Why can a divorcee
not marry a kohen but a widow can? And if a widow is
good enough for a kohen, why is she not good enough for a
Kohen Gadol?

When dealing with questions like this we must always
first accept the possibility that we may not discover the
Torah's motives. Quite clearly the Torah's laws in this
matter mean to preserve the holiness of the kohen who is
employed in the service of the Lord. A woman who may not
marry a priest bears some sort of taint that will somehow
affect the purity of her man; and for some reason the
taint of a divorcee is greater than that of the widow.
Is this treatment towards the woman fair? Suppose the
divorcee is a perfectly fine woman whose divorce ended an
unsuitable, or worse - an abusive marriage, why should
she be caused further suffering by a law that limits her
opportunities for future happiness?

We must recognize that fairness is not a factor in
the laws we are discussing. Consider the CHALALA - she
may not marry a kohen though she herself may have never
been with a man - her disqualification is based on the
behavior of her parents. No, any question of fairness
seems to miss the point that the Torah is not addressing
the woman's perspective here at all. Our verses are not
worried about providing second chances for widows and
divorcees but about establishing a code of holiness for
its priests.

Despite the Torah's lack of explanation, let us make
some suggestions regarding the attitudes towards these
two women. There seems to be a stigma attached to a
divorcee that does not apply to a widow. Here is the
Torah's statement about divorce proceedings: "A man takes
a wife and possesses her. She fails to please him
because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he
writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and
sends her away from his house" (Deuteronomy 24:1).

This passage clearly blames the marriage's failure
on the woman - she is undesirable, she is rejected and
she is sent away. It is this taint which bars her from
marrying a priest, not the fact that she has slept with a
man. Contrast, for example, a single woman who has slept
with a man whom she could theoretically marry. This
woman, though not a virgin, may marry a kohen. But as for
our case, perhaps the Torah recognizes that people look
down on a divorced woman in a way that they don't a
widow. Men may not want to date women who were in a
failed marriage fearing that there's something wrong with
the woman's ability to sustain a marriage, holding out
for a single woman instead. Women may hold the same
perception about divorced men, but Judaism does not have
priestesses to contend with.

At this point we might accuse the Torah of
sustaining a societal prejudice against divorced women.
Why doesn't the law rise above beliefs that prejudge
people, and encourage its adherents to see that just
because one relationship failed doesn't mean that a woman
is incapable or undeserving of happiness? Is every
divorce the woman's fault? Indeed, the halakha grants a
wife the power to demand a divorce on the grounds of
abuse by her husband. The Shulkhan Arukh Even haEzer
states that a court can force a man to divorce his wife
should he refuse to provide for her basic needs (chapter
154 paragraph 3). Rema (Rav Moshe Isserlish 16th
century) adds that a Beit Din can take such action should
the husband repeatedly get angry at his wife or beat her.

Nevertheless, although a wife may initiate the
divorce, the Torah states unequivocally that she does not
divorce her husband - it is he who divorces her. This law
is of course troublesome to some people, but whatever its
reason, it seems to be at the heart of our issue. Even
if the problem in the marriage is the husband's abusive
behavior, it is he who sends the wife to freedom.
Perhaps it is merely that image of the woman packing up
and leaving her husband's house which keeps her from
marrying a kohen. Even the possibility that she was to
blame is enough of a stain to bar her from the priestly
class.

Before we proceed to our next idea, we might mention
another situation where the Torah identifies levels of
desirability in women. In Deuteronomy 22 the Torah
addresses this case: "If a man comes upon a virgin who is
not engaged and he seizes her and lies with her, and they
are discovered, the man who lay with her shall pay the
girl's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be
his wife. Because he has violated her, he can never have
the right to divorce her" (verses 28-29). Now, this law
may be unsettling to us (according to halakha the woman
can refuse tmatch), but the Torah may be addressing the
tragic reality of a rape victim who may have difficulty
getting married after the attack. Thus the rapist must
provide a future for his victim. Is it fair to the woman
that now men see her as less desirable? No, it's cruel
and insensitive. Perhaps we cannot understand why the
Torah chooses to recognize and accept human nature in
some cases, while demanding that we overcome our impulses
in others.

For our next suggestion, let us examine the Torah's
overall attitude towards the widow. The Torah repeatedly
expresses sympathy for the widowed woman, usually linking
her to orphans or the poor who are also considered
unfortunates. Early in the Torah's list of commandments
this warning appears in Exodus 22: "You shall not ill-
treat any widow or orphan. If you do mistreat them, I
will heed their outcry as soon as they cry out to Me, and
My anger shall blaze forth and I will put you to the
sword, and your own wives shall become widows and your
children orphans" (verses 21-23). We might argue that
really, neither a widow nor a divorcee should be allowed
to marry a kohen, but as part of the Torah's campaign of
sympathy for the widow, she is granted special
dispensation.

Why is the Torah overly protective of the widow?
Well, it seems that, like the orphan, the poor and the
stranger, she is on her own and needs God to take care of
her. As Rabbi Yose posits: "Why does God love orphans
and widows? It is because they have nobody to turn to
except Him as it says 'A Father of orphans and a Judge of
widows is God in His holy dwelling' (Psalms 68:6)
Therefore, he who steals from them is considered to have
stolen from God because He is their Father in heaven and
He will get angry" (Shemot Rabba 30:5). But isn't the
divorcee sent out of her husband's house also in need of
financial support? Why doesn't the Torah demand sympathy
for this underdog? Might the Torah feel that in general
a widow is an elderly woman whose husband has died of old
age leaving her with little resources to continue whereas
a divorcee might be much younger with greater chances to
remarry? Or does the Torah believe that a woman who has
left an unhappy marriage is better off emotionally than a
woman whose family has been visited by death and thus the
divorcee needs less communal support? If that were so,
we should find the SHAKAL - one who has lost a child, or
the widower, on the list of people requiring emotional
care.

For whatever the reason, the Torah warns readers
against taking advantage of the widow but not the
divorcee. God's compassion for the widow might extend to
allowing her to marry kohanim. The flaw in this argument
is that there are other women who have had previous
relations with men who are also permitted to the kohen -
such as the single woman sleeping with a man fit to marry
- whose inclusion cannot similarly be explained in terms
of sympathy.

The most obvious distinction between a widow and a
divorcee is that the divorcee's former husband is still
alive. A widow who remarries is completely untied to any
other man and although she might pine for her first
husband, a remarried divorcee can actually contemplate
returning to her man. Perhaps the existence of this
possibility taints the relationship between the kohen and
his wife. A Talmudic adage claims that "When a divorced
man marries a divorced woman, there are four minds in the
bed" (Pesachim 112a). Presumably this means that divorced
people often think about their former spouses.

We find a similar situation in a law regarding a man
and two sisters. Leviticus 18:18 cautions "Do not marry a
woman as a rival to her sister and uncover her nakedness
in the other's lifetime." As long as one's wife is
alive, a man may not marry her sister - even if he is
divorced from his first wife - for this will cause grief
to both women. While the original wife is still alive the
man's thoughts of her will have a negative affect on his
new relationship. The Torah of course does not rule out
all marriages to divorced women, but perhaps the fear of
longing for another man will taint a divorcee's marriage
to a kohen in a way that affects his holiness.

When it comes to the Kohen Gadol who cannot even
marry a widow, the Sefer HaChinuch expands our theory in
creating a "pure" relationship. In explaining Mitzva #272
- A Kohen Gadol is Commanded to Marry a Virgin - Rabbi
Aharon HaLevi (13th century) writes.

"The root of this commandment relates to the idea
that it is fundamental for all people to have pure
and clean thoughts, since the actions of the body
follow the thoughts of the mind. Therefore, it makes
sense for the highest servant to [marry] a woman who
has never formed any thoughts for a man except for
him, since he is the holy of holies. From their
union will emerge a child pure and clean and fit for
holy service. And lest you ask 'who is to say that a
virgin has not had any thoughts for another man
besides him, or cast her eyes on another?' the
answer is that as long as she has not turned her
thoughts to actions she is not disqualified, but
once she has been with a man she is."

It seems that for the High Priest even a dead husband's
memory may constitute a distraction for the wife, somehow
affecting her husband's duties.

Lastly, having a former husband still alive might
create problems for the kohen from a different
perspective. We are generally very concerned with
establishing the lineage of a kohen. Besides determining
whom he can marry and that he must serve in the Temple
system, the title kohen imposes a range of lifestyle
guidelines on a man - a kohen may eat teruma, may not
become "defiled" by a corpse (save certain close
relatives), must recite the Priestly Benediction, is
taught to diagnose leprosy and to oversee the ritual
cleansing of one who is thus afflicted, and so on.
Israelites may not perform any of the priestly functions
or enjoy any of the benefits. And so, it is obvious that
proving purity of descent from Aharon, the first kohen is
critical to allowing anybody to act as a kohen. Indeed,
if a doubt arises about whether an individual is a kohen
or not, all the restrictions on a kohen's life are
applied to him, but he may not perform any of the kohen's
duties (see Rambam Hilkhot Issurei Bi'a 20:17).

Perhaps we can employ this need to positively
identify kohanim to our question about a kohen's wives.
If a kohen's wife's first husband is still alive, there
exists the possibility (however slim) that she might
return to him at some point, creating doubt as to her
child's paternity. To avoid problems such as this, the
halakha mandates that a woman who is divorced or widowed
wait at least 90 days before remarrying (Hilkhot
Geirushin 11:18). If, of course, the kohen's wife's
first husband is no longer alive, waiting the requisite
90 days will insure paternity.

The first mishna in Massekhet Makkot discusses a
case of two witnesses falsely accusing a kohen's mother
of being a divorcee (making the kohen a CHALAL and
barring him from service) - in other words they accuse
the kohen's father of marrying a divorcee. While this
particular case does not bring into question the kohen's
lineage, it shows that the Talmud is concerned about
villains causing trouble for blameless kohanim. Were the
Torah to allow kohanim to marry divorcees, it might
provide opportunity for those same rogues to challenge
the paternity of the kohanim's sons, arguing that the
father is the first husband who is still lurking around.

I imagine it might be difficult for those who
believe that all people should be afforded equal
opportunities and rights, to accept some of the theories
I have included in this essay. I have used words such as
"taint" and "stigma," and risked offending readers who
feel that a divorcee's life might be hard enough without
hearing that her past will "affect her husband's duties."
I apologize to anyone who found my approach insensitive.

And perhaps my very attempt to understand the
Torah's laws in these matters was misplaced - for I have
tried to explain a spiritual issue using social
interpretations. While we may claim to understand
thdynamics of marriage, divorce, and loss on a personal
and emotional level, is it possible to grasp the
implications of these states on the varying levels of
sanctity that make up the hierarchy of the priesthood?
After all, in what way exactly is a kohen holier than an
Israelite, and how is a Kohen Gadol's superiority
manifested? And if we cannot answer these questions, how
can we possibly understand in what ways the spirituality
of the women we have been discussing alters these men and
the performance of their assigned tasks? Nevertheless, I
hope that some of the ideas I have raised are a start
towards exploring the Torah's treatment of the kohen's
wives.

YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH
ALON SHEVUT, GUSH ETZION 90433

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