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Subject: Contemporary Jewish History Date: Sat, 7 Dec 1996 10:31:35 +0000 From: heb_roots_chr@mail.geocities.com Reply-To: heb_roots_chr@geocities.com To: "Hebraic Heritage Newsgroup"<heb_roots_chr@geocities.com>
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The Jewish University in Cyberspace
Student and Academics Department
World Zionist Organization
juice@wzo.org.il birnbaum@wzo.org.il
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Contemporary Jewish History
Robert Goldbert <bgoldbert@wzo.org.il>
9/12 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE
ISRAEL: 1949-1967
The war of independence left the newly-created state of Israel with control of some 80% of the area of mandatory western
Palestine, an area much larger than that originally allocated to the Jews by the U.N. These borders, created by the armistice
agreements signed between Israel and her Arab neighbors in 1949, remained Israel's de-facto borders until 1967. The declared aim of
these armistice agreements was to be a first step "towards liquidation of the armed dispute and restoration of peace to
Palestine. " Thus by the end of the war Israel had, in theory, gained sovereignty over agreed and secure borders that had been
determined by negotiations between the sides and with the support and approval of the United Nations. The reality, however, turned
out to be very different from theory. As mentioned in the last lecture, the armistice agreements signed at the end of the war were
not peace treaties, and none of Israel's neighbors agreed to recognize her right to exist, to negotiate with her, or to make
peace with her. Thus, despite her impressive achievements during the war, Israel had not achieved stability or tranquillity.
1. The Arab Refugee Problem
One of the most disturbing aspects of the war of independence was the refugee problem resulting from Israel's victory. During
the war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled their homes, creating one of the world's worst and most controversial
refugee problems. Over the years, arguments have been made by both sides over who was guilty of dispossessing these Arabs of their
homes and creating the refugee problem. On the one hand, it is true that Arab civilians, including men, women and children, were
killed in the fighting (as were Jewish civilians). Probably the prime example of this was the Irgun attack on the Arab village of
Deir Yassin during the early days of the war. The village, lying on the outskirts of Jerusalem, had been used by the Arabs to seal
off Jewish access to Jerusalem as part of the Arab siege on the city (see last lecture), as had other villages on the way to
Jerusalem. The lrgun claims that it sent messengers to the village to warn of the impending attack in order to minimize the loss of
civilian life, but the truck either got ambushed or stuck in the mud on the way. In any case, either the warning never made it to
the village or did make it but was ignored, and when the village was attacked many women and children were killed. When news of
this attack and the resulting loss of civilian life spread to other villages, the Arab population began to flee, fearing the further
advance of the Jewish units.
Thus the Arabs fled the country partly out of fear of the Jews. This fear, however, was exploited by the Arab leaders who wished to use the exodus for propaganda purposes and to incite the Arab states against Israel. They knew that the Palestinian refugees would not only make a good propaganda tool during the war, but would also make a good case for the dispossession of the Jews from Palestine after the war, just as the Palestinian Arabs had been dispossessed. So sure, in fact, were the Arab leaders of their eventual victory over Israel that they encouraged and sometimes even compelled the Palestinians to abandon their homes to make way for the advancing Arab armies and promised to return their properties after the Jews were "driven into the sea". This exploitation of the Palestinian's fear of the Jews by the Arab leadership soon led to a mass flight of Palestinian Arabs. When the Arabs lost the war and the Jews were not driven into the sea, these unfortunate peasants were left stranded and homeless.
After their defeat in the war, the Arab states refused to permit the refugees to settle in their midst. Although vastly underpopulated, they preferred to continue to use the misery of the displaced Arabs as a propaganda tool against Israel. The Jews, for their part, could not readmit the refugees for several reasons: For one, many Arab homes had in the meantime been occupied by Jewish refugees from Europe and the Muslim countries (see below). More importantly, it was believed that letting hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees into the country would endanger Israelis security, especially considering the war that had just been fought and its consequences. Besides, Israel really did not view itself as responsible for creating the refugee problem in the first place, as it was the Arabs who attacked the Jews and then compelled the Palestinians to flee. Israel did, however, make several offers of compensation to the refugees, all of which were curtly refused. [The whole issue of the Palestinian refugee problem is vastly complex and highly emotional. Each side has its own arguments about what happened during and after the war. For an alternative outlook different from the one that I have given above, I suggest reading Benny Morris' books and articles. From the Hebrew University, Morris is one of a new generation of "Post-Zionist" revisionist researchers who have questioned conventional thinking about the creation of the state of Israel and the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although highly controversial, and, in my opinion, to be taken somewhat with a grain of salt, these writers have forced a re-examination of some of these issues]. II. The "Ingathering of the Exiles" It has been said that two basic factors determined the development of the young State of Israel: The Arab's unwillingness to accept Israelis existence and their continued determination to destroy it, which has created within the population a feeling of being under constant siege. This threat has, in turn, served as a unifying factor, strengthening solidarity and internal cohesion within Israeli society. The other factor was the mass immigration which flooded the country in the years immediately after its establishment and brought hundreds of thousands of Jews to Israel. These Jews came from all over the world, and although they were united in religion and emotional identity they were separated by language, customs, standard of living and way of life, as well as social and cultural values. Similar to the effects of the Jewish immigration to the U.S. around the turn of the century (see lecture II), the mass immigration to Israel produced a tension between veterans and newcomers, Ashkenazim and Sephardim, rich and poor. Thus while Arab hostility created cohesion and solidarity, immigration served as a diversifying factor, creating tensions and undermining unity. Despite the difficulties associated with it, however, immigration was regarded by all as a vital need for the state and the "Ingathering of the Exiles", always one of the raisons d'etre of the Zionist endeavor, now became one of the prime objectives of the State of Israel.
The displaced Jews of Europe came first, and the detention camps on Cyprus and in Germany were soon emptied. Immediately afterwards came the Jews of the Muslim countries, who were allowed by their governments to leave provided they left practically all their possessions behind. "Operation Magic Carpet" was the name appropriately given to the airlift of Yemenite and Iranian Jews, to whom the land and sea routes to Israel were closed. By the end of 1950 some 45,000 Yemenite Jews had arrived, and in 1950-51 some 122,000 Iraqi Jews had immigrated (out of a total of 130,000). Jews also came from North Africa; for example, 30,000 out of Libya's 35,000 Jews immigrated to Israel during these years. From Eastern Europe came 37,000 out of Bulgaria's 45,000 Jews, and by the end of 1951 104,000 Jews had come from Poland and 119,000 from Rumania. As a result, Israel's Jewish population more than doubled in the years 1948-52, from 665,000 in May 1948 to 1,330,000 in June 1951 and over 1,600,000 by May 1952, including about 175,000 Arabs. Of the new arrivals, about half were Ashkenazim and half were Sephardim. Almost all were poor, few knew a trade and many suffered from various ailments. Some of the young people had spent most of their lives in camps. Thus the absorption of the immigrants was a tremendous task and posed great challenges to the state, both economic and social, medical and psychological. The immigrants were settled in the abandoned Arab villages and towns, and when these became full ramshackle shanty-towns called "ma'abarot" were established. Many of the new immigrants soon drifted into urban slums looking for work. The resulting financial burden on the young state was immense, however, the government succeeded in maintaining vital services despite the difficult situation. Much of the cost of absorbing the immigrants fell on the shoulders of world Jewry, and Israel's dependence on financial aid from the diaspora, already considerable during the war of independence, now became even greater. The government was able to provide a basic education and health services for everybody and succeeded in considerably raising the health standards of the immigrants. The diseases that many had brought with them were overcome, malaria and tuberculosis were almost completely obliterated, and the infant death-rate declined steadily. Within a few years Israeli health services had attained a commendable standard, comparable to that of the advanced European countries.
One of the government's central objectives was to attain the complete integration and absorption of all the different immigrant communities into the larger Israeli society, but despite the progress, achievements were modest:. The problem of providing all of the immigrants with work and proper housing were almost insurmountable, and the process of their adjusting to the new environment and reaching economic and social parity with the veteran Israelis was bound to take a long time. Thus, the full absorption and integration of the immigrants into Israeli society has still not been completely reached, and the process of immigrant-absorption is still continuing today. III. The Fedayeen Attacks and the Sinai Campaign Starting in 1950 Palestinian terror groups, or Fedayeen, began systematic raids into Israel from Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In late 1954 President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt took the lead in formally establishing Fedayeen groups in the Gaza strip and the Sinai, both controlled by Egypt. The Egyptians provided the raiders with bases, arms and training. Throughout 1955 an increasing number of raids were launched into Israel from Egypt. The terrorists would enter Israel from Gaza at night and mine roads, bomb settlements and ambush Israeli vehicles. In the years 1951-1955, hundreds of Israelis were killed by the Fedayeen and much property was destroyed or carried off.
Israel, for its part, would retaliate with reprisals into the countries that harbored the terrorists, particularly Egypt. Egypt responded by blocking the Suez Canal against Israeli shipping and prohibited the passage of goods earmarked for Israel. In a clear effort by the Russians to increase its influence in the Middle East by equipping the Arabs, in September 1955 Czechoslovakia signed a wide-scale arms agreement with Egypt. Thus emboldened, Nasser upped the ante by increasing the Fedayeen attacks from Egyptian territory and in 1956 sealed off the Israeli port of Eilat by blockading the Straits of Tiran, at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, to Israeli shipping. He also placed offensive military equipment in forward positions in the Sinai. Finally, in October 1956 a joint Arab military command was established between Egypt, Jordan and Syria, headed by the Egyptian Chief of Staff.
Due to Nasser's aggressive policies in the region, the United States began to dissociate itself from Egypt and refused to finance the building of the Aswan Dam. In reaction, and as a way to further show his strength in the Arab world and secure in the diplomatic support promised by his communist allies, Nasser challenged the western powers by nationalizing the Suez Canal. The Canal had been built and financed by the British and French, who now began to plan military action against Nasser. On October 29 1956, Israel, in co-ordination with Britain and France, mobilized its small but efficient army and invaded the Sinai Peninsula with the objectives of destroying the Fedayeen bases, opening the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and generally disrupting Nasser's aggressive military stance toward Israel.
Despite the superior equipment supplied them by Russia, the Egyptian army was no match for the Israelis. By November 2 Gaza was captured, and by November 6 Israel had taken the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Israel captured a large quantity of arms and equipment, inflict heavy losses on the Egyptians and took some 6,000 prisoners. Most importantly, Israel succeeded in destroying the Fedayeen bases in the Sinai and Gaza and breaking the Egyptian blockade on Israeli shipping. Simultaneously, France and Britain attacked Egypt by air and landed paratroopers along the Suez Canal, demanding its return. At this point, the United States and Russia, competing with one another for Nasser's gratitude, demanded the cessation of all hostilities and the return of the situation to the previous status quo. Britain and France reluctantly and angrily complied with the superpower's demands, but Israel hesitated to be deprived of the fruits of its victory.
Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union exerted heavy pressure on Israel to withdraw. Under Russian threats to send "volunteers" to Egypt, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced on November 7 that Israel would withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza, but managed to get an American promise that freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba would be safeguarded and that the U.N. would station a peace-keeping force on the Egyptian side of the border to prevent the resumption of Egyptian raids into Israel. Thus the Sinai campaign ended with mixed results for Israel: It succeeded in stopping Fedayeen activity and in opening the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, but it did not alter the borders. Not did it harm Nasser who, because of the forced Israeli, French and British withdrawals and because he still retained the Suez Canal, succeeded in turning the military defeat into a political victory and strengthening his status in the Arab world. Israelis image also suffered a blow in the eyes of world opinion and especially in the third world, where she was now regarded as a partner in an "imperialistic plot." Furthermore, any damage done to Egyptian military manpower and equipment was quickly replaced with Russian aid. IV. The Eichmann Trial In May 1960 the Israeli Mossad intelligence agency located the notorious Nazi was criminal Adolf Eichmann (see lecture VI), who had been living in hiding in Argentina. They kidnapped him and brought him to Israel where he was charged with murder and put on trial in April 1961. A prominent lawyer of his choice was brought from Germany to defend him and three of Israelis foremost judges were appointed to preside over the trial. The trial lasted for five months, and a total of 112 witnesses were called to testify. Eichmann's defense, like that of other Nazis who were brought to trial elsewhere, was that he was but a simple cog in the wheel of Nazi policy -- that he was merely obeying orders. The judges took a further three months to consider the evidence and render their verdict, which was finally handed down in December, 1961. Eichmann was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. The execution took place in May 1962.
The Argentine government had vigorously protested to Israel against the violation of its sovereignty by the act of kidnapping on its soil. But the fact is that Argentina had done nothing to cleanse its soil of Nazi refugees. During the trial the sentiments of the civilized world was divided. Many voices were raised in condemnation of the kidnapping and holding the trial in Israel, but at the same time no one offered any cogent suggestion as to what other course of action was proper under the circumstances. The trial also repeatedly revealed how little the allied governments had done during the war to save Europe's Jews, thus both the U.S., Britain and Russia, as well as Germany, were on trial along with Eichmann. The trial had the effect of serving as a remainder of the horrors of the Holocaust to a world that was all too eager to forget its cruelties and the lessons to be learned from it. V. Rapid Population Growth and Development Following the Sinai Campaign, two more waves of immigration arrived in Israel. During the years 1955-57 more then 160,000 new immigrants came, especially from the North African nations due to the intensification of Arab nationalism there. Thus these years witnessed the arrival of 70,000 Jews from Morocco and 15,000 from Tunisia. Additionally, tens of thousands of Jews arrived from Poland and Hungary after the anti-Communist agitation in those countries and a further several thousand Jews came to Israel after being expelled from Egypt in the wake of the Sinai Campaign. After a short lull, another wave of immigration took place from 1961-64 when some 215,000 immigrants arrived, including a considerable number from Eastern Europe.
By the end of 1965, Israelis population consisted of 2,299,100 Jews, 212,400 Muslims, 57,000 Christians and 29,000 Druses and other assorted religious groups. At the end of 1966 the total population of the country was 2,656,800, with 45% of the Jewish population being of Asian or North African origin. Thus the country was slowly loosing its European character, while at the same time many of these "Oriental" Jews felt discriminated against by the European majority. Despite great efforts in the fields of culture and education, the social and economic gap between Ashkenazirn and Sephardim is still being felt in Israel today.
As a result of the rapid population growth, Israel also experienced a huge expansion of its cities and urban centers. In the late 1920 *s, Tel Aviv was a small town of some 30,000. By 1966 it was a bustling city of close to 400,000 containing two universities. Bar llan and Tel Aviv University. Fifty miles to the north lies the industrial port-city of Haifa, with a 1966 population of 200,000. It was on the slopes of Mt. Carmel overlooking Haifa Bay that Israel * s premier engineering school, the Technion, was built in 1966. Also in 1966 the city of Ashkelon, originally an ancient Biblical city dating back to the time of the Philistines, began building its own port intended to supplement, if not to rival, the port of Haifa. In the Negev desert, Beersheba, a frontier town in 1960, grew into a thriving metropolis within half a decade. Eilat, at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea, consisted of but a few huts before the Sinai campaign. By 1965 it had grown to a port city of major importance for commerce between Israel and Africa and Asia.
Finally, by 1966 Jerusalem's population had grown to 280,000. Because the War of Independence had left the city divided and the Old City in the hands of the Jordanians, the Jewish part of the city had to grow westward, and the New City began to flourish. Because the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital, both on Mt. Scopus in the eastern part of the city, were also under Jordanian control, a new university campus and hospital were built on the western part of the city in the early 1960's. The new campus contains the National Library and the new Hadassah Hospital contains the famous Chagall windows depicting the Twelve Tribes. The Israel Museum was built next to the new campus, and connected to it is the Shrine of the Book, containing the Dead Sea Scrolls and other archaeological treasures found throughout Israel. On a hill overlooking both the museum and the university stands the Knesset, Israel's parliament building, dedicated on August 30, 1966.
This rosy picture of growth and development was interrupted by the outbreak of the Six-Day war in June, 1967, which is where we will begin the next lecture.
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