Subject: JUICE Pioneers 10 - The Haganah Date: Wed, 3 Jun 1998 00:30:24 +0000 To: "Hebraic Heritage Newsgroup"<heb_roots_chr@geocities.com>
From: JUICE Administration <juice@wzo.org.il> To: pioneers@wzo.org.il Subject: JUICE Pioneers 10 ============================================================== World Zionist Organization Jewish University in CyberspacE juice@wzo.org.il birnbaum@wzo.org.il http://www.wzo.org.il ============================================================== Course: Pioneers of Israel Lecture: 10/12 Lecturer: Doron Geller The Haganah Soon after the fall of Tel-Hai and Kfar Giladi in March 1920, a decision was taken to organize broader self-defense measures in the yishuv. When the Arab riots broke out in Jerusalem and Jaffa in April 1920, the Jews began to realize that they could not depend on the British for their own security. Jabotinsky and many others hoped that the Jewish Legion formed in World War I would develop and expand into a regular Jewish army in Palestine under British auspices. The British thoroughly frustrated that attempt, however, as was made clear by their prevention of any Jewish forces to even defend their people being beaten and killed within the Old City Walls of Jerusalem in April 1920. It became clear to much of the yishuv that an underground defense force would have to be created in order to deter Arab attacks and at the same time not arouse the suspicion of the British Mandatory power. Ha-Shomer, hardly a factor after the creation of the Jewish Legion in 1917, and members of the almost defunct Jewish Legion itself decided in 1920 to create that force. In June 1920 Ha-Shomer officially disbanded and the Haganah (meaning "defense") was created in its place. The main officers and men comprising the Haganah were former members of Ha-Shomer and the Jewish Legion. The Yishuv, however, was lulled into a sense of security with the removal of the British military Administration - openly hostile to Zionist aims - by the British government after the riots of 1920. A Civilian Government was set up the same year. A British Jew, Herbert Samuel, was appointed as the first High Commissioner of the British Civilian Administration. This administration was far more sympathetic to Zionist aims. Thus in the 1920's Haganah activities were fairly dormant, mostly dealing with small-scale arms acquisitions. The riots of May 1921 caught the Haganah unprepared, but there were no further serious disturbances in Palestine until August 1929. The 1929 riots in many ways marked a turning point in the history of Jewish defense in Palestine. The quiet of the previous eight years had lulled the British into a laissez-faire approach to security. The situation, in retrospect, was almost ludicrous. Hardly any British security forces were stationed in the country at the time, and the local Arabs employed as policemen by the British did not fulfill their duty to protect the Jews against Arab rioters. Hebron was the city worst hit by Arab violence. Hebron's Jews were mostly Sephardi and religious, taking no part in the Zionist movement. But that didn't deter the Arab mobs. Crowds of Arabs armed with sticks, clubs and swords swarmed their way into the Jewish Quarter of Hebron and began hacking, raping, and killing Jewish men, women and children. There was exactly one British policeman in the town - R.O. Cafferata - assisted by a few Arab constables. As riots got out of hand, Cafferata did most of the work himself, chasing the rampaging Arabs, which even included one of his own Arab police officers. The scenes were gruesome and grizzly; 64 Jews were killed and 54 wounded in two days. There was no Haganah in Hebron. Neither was there a Haganah in Safed. Like Hebron, Safed was a community of religious Jews, taking no part in the Zionist movement. The Jews in Safed, as in Hebron, had lived amicably with their Arab neighbors for centuries. But they were massacred as well. By contrast, the Haganah had sufficiently organized and prepared itself to defend the Jewish communities of Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, and Haifa. Thus they were spared mass slaughter. The Haganah was prepared in other, smaller settlements as well. Not every settlement had adequate protection, but those that did were able to stand firm in the face of Arab violence. "A deep impression was made by the defense of Huldah, in which a handful of Haganah members fought against thousands of Arab attackers until the British forces evacuated them." After a few days British forces began pouring into the country and restored order. But the Haganah was more determined than ever to limit the damage of Arab attacks if they should ever materialize again. "Steps were taken to speed up training and procure arms. No longer were isolated settlements to be without the means of their self-protection." The period of 1929-1935 was once again one of quiet development, but the Haganah grew considerably. Firstly, the population of the yishuv almost doubled between 1929 and 1933. Many young men and a considerable number of young women joined as well. Most members of the Haganah came from the agricultural settlements, from the kibbutzim and moshavim. They mostly subscribed to the labor Zionist ideal, emphasizing physical labor and advocating self-defense as a last resort. Training usually consisted of learning the use of revolvers and hand grenades, and sometimes rifles. The Haganah began manufacturing their own weapons, usually hand-grenades, on a small scale as well. But most of the training was only held on week-ends in that the covert nature of the organization necessitated a secretive approach to training (at any time the British could arrest them and confiscate their illegal weapons). "The rural settlements began to organize into `blocs', and by 1936 about 20 of these blocs came into existence. At the head of each bloc was a bloc commander who was responsible for the training of its members, acquiring arms and protecting them, and gathering intelligence on the security situation in the area. The position of the Haganah in each bloc was largely dependent upon the initiative of its commander." The leaving of authority to the initiative of the local commander was a precursor of the Israeli army, which has always encouraged individual initiative and improvisation rather than relying on the tradition-bound models of more established armies such as the British one, whom the Haganah members were in such close contact with. The Arab disturbances that broke out in 1936 were by far the most serious and long-lasting the yishuv had ever faced. They were mainly instigated by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and a fiery and fiercely anti-Jewish Arab nationalist. During World War II he cooperated with Hitler. Beginning in 1936 Arab bands from all over Palestine - and from Syria and Iraq as well - attacked Jewish settlements throughout the yishuv. The riots of 1929 had given the Jews bitter experience, however, and the Haganah "confronted riots by using methods learned from the previous disturbances. The Jewish quarters and settlements in the cities and countryside were surrounded by defense devices: wire fences, concrete positions, trenches, communication trenches, and floodlights." The success of these measures soon proved itself. Although many villages were attacked, not one was abandoned. Gradually the Arabs concentrated more and more on attacking travellers on the open roads. Yitzhak Sadeh became one of the mainstays of the Haganah. He became something of a legend to his own men. Sadeh was born in Russia in 1890 and served in the Russian Army in World War I. He was decorated for his bravery. While studying at university following the war, he became a champion wrestler and weight lifter. When Joseph Trumpeldor died at Tel-Hai in 1920, Sadeh decided to immigrate to Eretz-Israel. He had met Trumpeldor in 1917 and Trumpeldor had had a decisive impact on him. When Sadeh arrived in Palestine he became a founding member of the Gedud ha-Avodah, a labor battalion founded in honor of Trumpeldor. He worked as a stone quarrier - he was an expert - and provided other members of the battalion with military training. Thus he was the fulfillment of the labor ideal par excellence, as Ha-Shomer and Joseph Trumpeldor had come to be. Sadeh, however, retired from public service when the Gedud ha-Avodah (also known as the Joseph Trumpeldor Labor Battalion) disintegrated in the 1920's. But when the 1936 riots broke out he was quick to volunteer for service, and quickly rose through the ranks to become a commander and decision-maker in the Haganah High Command. The 1936 riots posed a serious test to the Haganah. "In the north and south, there were solitary agricultural communes, isolated in desert and wilderness, remote from centres of help. They were obvious targets for Arab bands. With the memories of 1921 and 1929 fresh in the minds of the Mufti. They were attacked. In every case, the settlers defended themselves. They suffered casualties. But they inflicted casualties on their attackers. No Jewish settlement was evacuated and none was wiped out." The British were frequently unable to come to the assistance of these isolated settlements, and if the Jews had only resisted according to British plans - whereby hardly effective weapons had to remain in sealed cases until the time of attack - Jewish settlements certainly would have been wiped out, their inhabitants massacred, the formerly beautiful settlements reduced to a burning memory. The Arab attackers had a much easier time of acquiring weapons than the Jews did. The frontiers of Palestine bordered on other Arab states friendly to their cause, and thus the acquisition of weapons and cross-border movement of Arab bands, attacking and escaping, was relatively easy. Fortunately the British did not completely hinder the development of Jewish defense. The fact that the Arab riots and even rebellion was as often directed against the British as well as the Jews furthered the readiness of the British to assist the Jews. The British first permitted the establishment of a Jewish Settlement Police - also known as supernumerary police. They were charged with protecting and defending Jewish settlements and were paid, trained, and equipped by the British. These also included mobile units, who were "responsible in their areas for patrolling roads and crops, reinforcing settlements under attack, and ambushing Arab guerrillas on their approach to or retreat from Jewish zones." Many of these supernumerary police were Haganah members, and as such the Haganah was given semi-official recognition by the Mandatory government - for the time being it suited its purposes. By 1940, the number of supernumeraries reached 16,000 members. But these units did not go on the offensive, did not take active initiative to track down, find, and destroy the Arab bands in their home bases. That was left to Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads, which we learned about 3 weeks ago. Many Haganah members joined Wingate and benefited greatly from his training, experience, initiative, and improvisation, which in turn the Haganah members bequeathed to men under their own command. The above-mentioned Yitzhak Sadeh had very similar ideas to Orde Wingate, and was Wingate's Jewish counterpart. After Wingate was withdrawn and transferred from Palestine by the British authorities, Yitzhak Sadeh remained the guiding force behind the Haganah. Yigal Allon, another great Israeli commander, called Yitzhak Sadeh "a military genius of world caliber, one of the greatest commanders in Jewish history, the father of modern warfare, the teacher of most young Israeli commanders, including myself." Along with Wingate Yitzhak Sadeh encouraged the use of active defense to respond to Arab attacks. "By teaching the Haganah units to patrol remote fields, plantations and roads, to ambush enemy paths, and to carry out raids against enemy bases which helped to check the enemy's initiative, they effectively pulled the Haganah out of its trenches and barbed wire into the open field, making it adopt a more active defense." The Haganah units, often in cooperation with Wingate, learned to fight the enemy by night as well as by day, in hilly country as well as the open field. As Yigal Allon writes, the "immediate aims of the Arabs were to annihilate as many existing settlements as possible (either by isolating them or by direct attack), to prevent the creation of new settlements, to break down Jewish resistance, to deter the Jews from claiming statehood. Their ultimate aim was to force the British to repudiate their commitments to the Zionist movement, and to establish a state with an Arab majority." The first objective, regarding security, achieved exactly the opposite of the intended effect. Many new Jewish settlements were established in the midst of the Arab rebellion in the most isolated areas. These were called stockade and watchtower settlements, and in my recent traveling around the north of the country, I saw numerous former watchtowers from the pre-state era - they are actually not very high at all - in the midst of settlements that no longer have need of them. But at the time these settlements extended the reach of Jewish settlement in Eretz-Israel, and by dint of their successful defense, established facts which could be used for future territorial boundaries. "The method employed was as original and unmilitary as it was effective. On the chosen site they would erect a whole settlement-outpost prefabricated out of wood, composed of a number of wooden huts, a communal dining hall, kitchens, and so on. In the middle of the campus there would be a watchtower with a searchlight at the top; the whole was surrounded by a wooden double-wall filled with bullet-proof rubble and punctuated by firing-slits; and this in turn was encircled by barbed wire and mine strips." The setting up of a rudimentary village, equipped for both living and defense, was established in the space of a single day. By nightfall the new settlers already had a new home. "By day, the Jewish Settlement Police provided the immediate defense, while the illegal units undertook the ambushes and patrols further off, guarding the approaches to the new settlements. The settlers themselves, carrying light arms while at work and taking it in turn to guard their settlement, were a modern version of the labourers in Nehemiah who with one hand `wrought in their work, and with the other hand held a weapon.'" The surrounding land was then cultivated under the protection of the new settlement/fortress, and soon enough, wives and children would be brought in to the new settlement - a cause for celebration, in that these darting settlers were successfully establishing a Jewish settlement and Jewish life in the further reaches of Eretz-Israel under extremely trying conditions. This was also the reaction to Arab attack - not retaliation or revenge, but the further building of Jewish settlements. Former Israeli army officer Moshe Pearlman writes in The Army of Israel; "This constructive reaction revealed the trend of the Haganah.It showed that Haganah was in truth the military arm of a thoughtful, democratic, peace-loving people. For throughout these trying years, and in face of grave provocation, Haganah never perpetrated any act of aggression, never struck the first blow - even when they knew the dangers of restraint; never resorted to destructive acts of retaliation; spurned the vendetta principle of a life for a life. Their motto was "Havlagah", the Hebrew word meaning `Restraint.' And Palestinian Jewry, standing behind Haganah, lived up to it with nobility. Haganah proved itself the popular militia, disciplined for the defence, and defence alone, of Palestinian Jewry." Not everyone agreed with their policy of restraint, however, such as the Irgun and Lehi, who advocated a more violent response to Arab terror. The "iron" restraint the Haganah prided itself on was seen by some Jews in the yishuv as a continuation of traditionally Jewish passive attitudes to provocation. The Haganah attitude was that it was a defense force used merely to beat off their attackers - nothing more. They did not want to descend into a Levantine blood-feud situation, common enough for the Jews in the Bible and the Arabs of the modern Middle East, but quite against the idealistic compunctions of these idealistic, European-born settlers, inspired by socialist doctrines emphasizing the brotherhood, progress, and development of modern man. Their Zionism - and their Haganah - was for many of them a way of putting their inspired socialist ideals into practice, defending them, and assuring the Jewish people could develop a national home on the land of their forefathers. As the Haganah commanders explained to those who disagreed with their policy of mere defense said; "Let us ever remember the meaning of Haganah. It is our defense force, the militia that enables us to continue our work of settlement and creation. It is subordinate to those ideals, the instrument that enables us to live here and work. It is our servant. It must never become our master." The Haganah became a necessity during the Arab Rebellion of 1936-1939. But it also expanded, improved its methods and capabilities. It admirably withstood the threat and actualization of Arab attacks once it had the means to do so, just as its predecessor Ha-Shomer had. The end of the Arab riots brought out the White Paper of 1939 - severely curtailing Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine. But soon after the White Paper was issued World War II broke out, and Haganah members, like much of the rest of the yishuv, rushed to enlist in the British Army. Many Palestinian Jewish soldiers served in the British Army during World War II, both in units under British command or all-Jewish units. They tried to serve in the front lines in order to strike at Hitler's armies, but the British consistently delayed their requests for front-line stationing or real battle experience. Both sides seemed to understand that cooperation was temporary; it was a marriage of convenience. Following the war, the Jews and British were likely to be at loggerheads over the future of Palestine. The British did not want too many trained and battle-hardened Jewish troops fighting against them; at the same time the British needed the Jews, as they were loyal and devoted - and needed - allies in a desperate war against Hitler, in which both the Jews and the British were threatened. After France was overrun by the Germans in 60 days in 1940, French forces in Syria and Lebanon declared themselves loyal to Vichy - and thus the enemies of the Jews. Jewish units, known as the Palmach, took part in the British invasion of Syria and Lebanon in August 1941, serving as guides and saboteurs. The Palmach had been set up a few short months before, in May 1941. It was to serve as an elite assault force within the Haganah, ready to strike at a moment's notice, and available for action at any time. They were quite effective in the Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile the Haganah prepared a number of German and Arabic-speaking Jews for intelligence assignments behind enemy lines, which were again of some assistance to the allied war efforts. There were losses too, such as the 23 Haganah men and their British commander who sailed to Tripoli, Lebanon, in May 1941 in order to blow up the oil refineries there. No trace of them was ever found. Through the first half of 1941 the momentum of the war was on the German side. They were advancing on their Eastern front deep into Russia. In the western desert of the Middle East they were approaching dangerously close to Egypt. The Germans could have approached via Turkey and Syria into Palestine, or if Rommel continued his desert victories in North Africa, through Egypt and Sinai into Palestine. Although hardly anyone in the yishuv knew of the extent of Hitler's extermination of the Jews in Europe in 1941, everyone was aware that he was brutal to the Jews and thus the Jews in the yishuv began to prepare for a worst-case scenario of a Nazi invasion. The British also increased their training of Haganah men as saboteurs, laying mines, blowing up radar installations, railroad tracks, military depots, and other commando and intelligence operations. Jews were also trained in advanced systems of communications. The Palestinian Jews were quite afraid that if the British Army in Egypt would fall, the British would evacuate their forces from Palestine and would retreat further into the Middle East. This could have meant doom for the Jewish community in the yishuv. Haganah men of course continued to maintain alertness for the possibility of Arab riots during the war, which would have been of far less consequence than a German invasion. In the event, the Arabs of Palestine were quiet during the war, waiting to see which way the war would go. But an elaborate plan was devised by the Haganah for the defense of the yishuv in the case of German invasion. As Yigal Allon writes, the "scheme devised was a highly imaginative one. It was resolved to turn the area consisting of the whole of Mount Carmel, the valley of Zebulun (between Haifa and Acre), the mountain chains of the western Galilee based on Haifa Bay on the Mediterranean, and an airfield strip on the coast into a huge, well-fortified escape fortress for all the Jews of Palestine (numbering just over a half a million): a kind of modern Massada, only stronger and therefore with better chances of survival than its historic prototype. It was thought that the combination of a hilly country with some access to the sea and air, fully supported by the Allied forces in the matter of supplies, defended in depth and assisted by guerrilla raids against enemy lines of communication, bases and installations, carried a fair chance of success." In the event the scheme was never put into practice. There was no need. Palestine was a safe haven during the war for the Jews who could make it there or who were already there. The Russians stopped the rolling German advance outside of Leningrad on the eastern front, and Rommel's western advance was stopped by British forces commanded by General Montgomery, both in 1941. Much of Haganah activities thus were concentrated on facilitating illegal immigration into Palestine as well as illegal arms acquisition. Both were difficult prospects. The vigilant British forces were determined to thwart both of these endeavors, especially as the tide of the war turned in their favor in 1941 and 1942 - and thus there was less of a need for a Jewish contribution to the war effort. A trickle of illegal immigration did take place during the war. The Haganah was slightly more successful with arms acquisition, from British stores in Palestine, and more so from the remains of Rommel's army in the desert in North Africa, from purchases in Europe, and from British and Arabs who could be bought. The training, battle experience, and preparations for battle all improved the effectiveness of the Haganah as well. On the other hand, while the Haganah cooperated with the British for the duration of the war, dissident groups such as the Stern Gang and the Irgun did not. The Haganah even gave intelligence information to the British regarding the whereabouts of Lehi members, and in some cases Lehi members were killed as a result of this information. The Haganah later did the same to the Irgun. Once the Irgun proclaimed its revolt against British rule in Palestine in 1944, the Haganah leadership, instructed by its civilian supporters in the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut - especially Ben-Gurion - ordered the Haganah to assist the British in finding these dissident groups. In the Fall of 1944, under pressure from the British, the Haganah, led by Palmach officers, began taking part in operations against the Irgun. At first these actions were mainly confined to interrogation and imprisonment under Haganah auspices, but later the Haganah turned members of the Irgun over to the British. This period, called the "Saison" in the historiography of the yishuv, left a bitter taste in everyone's mouth, those who were effected and those who took part. The Haganah ceased these operations after about six months, while Irgun activity was still going on. But this was a sordid period in the history of the left-wing establishment and its security arm, the Haganah. Even a devoted left-winger, Yehuda Bauer, writes "The question was asked then, and has been asked since, what justification there was for handing over Jews to a regime (the English) which had watched passively while Jews fleeing for their lives were barred entry to what that regime itself still preferred to call their `national home.' Even if Etzel (an acronym for Irgun Tzvai Leumi, or short for the Irgun) was believed to comprise political criminals, handing them over to the British .was and remains a moral blemish on the Haganah's name." After World War II ended, however, the Haganah joined the Irgun and Lehi in an active rebellion against British rule. Rail lines and bridges were the most frequent objects of such attacks. Palmach units began destroying police and army equipment, and "the Haganah organized mass demonstrations that clashed with the British police and army. In addition to these, I.Z.L. (the Irgun) and Lehi carried out their activities with the approval of the Haganah." On June 17, 1946, "these activities reached their height with the blowing up of all the bridges on the borders of Palestine by the Haganah forces." The British responded by imprisoning the Jewish Agency Executive and conducting arms searches all over the kibbutzim and moshavim - and in some cases they found and confiscated considerable arms stores. The Haganah also stepped up its efforts in abetting "illegal immigration", bringing rusty old ships filled with thousands of survivors of the Nazi concentration camps to the shores of Palestine, such as the Exodus. The British turning away and maltreatment of these survivors turned world opinion substantially against a continuation of British rule, and this finally led to a United Nations partition resolution declaring a separate Arab and Jewish state in Palestine on November 29, 1947. By the war of Independence, beginning with the creation of the state of Israel on May 15, 1948, the Haganah could mobilize about 45,000 men, about 3,000 of them in the elite Palmach units. When the state of Israel was declared, the acting Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion , dissolved and disbanded all underground military units - including the Haganah - in the process of forming the Israeli Army. He wanted all partisan and political influences to be completely anathema to the army. The army was to be one of the people. But the ideals and leadership of the Haganah continued to exist in the Israeli Army long after the Haganah was disbanded. This is perhaps best exemplified by the name of the I.D.F. (Israel Defense Forces) in Hebrew, "Tzava Haganat Yisrael". The Haganah was incorporated in name, as we can see, as well as in spirit. The creators of the Haganah welded the Jewish people in Palestine - with all their partisan differences - into an effective fighting force in the form of the I.D.F. The Israeli Defense Forces, led by former Haganah members such as Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and many other heroes who worked so hard for Jewish safety and security during the pre-state era, were there for the state of Israel in its infancy, when she faced the combined challenge and threat of five Arab armies on her doorstep. Israel lost many lives in the War of Independence - about 6,ooo Jews died - but they died so that Israel may live. Fifty years later, we still appreciate the enormous contribution of these pioneer/ fighters of the Haganah, who by their forbearance, sacrifice, drive, and determination, assured the creation and existence of Israel for all Jews, everywhere, and hopefully, forever. Bibliography 1). Yigal Allon - The Making of Israel's Army 2). Encyclopedia Judaica 3). Munya Mardor - Strictly Illegal 4). Moshe Pearlman - The Army of Israel **********************************************************************